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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARZER, Senior District Judge. 
 
The question before us is whether the district court 
abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion under 




On July 6, 1993, defendant Dale Kaymark allegedly 
injured plaintiff Wayne E. Boley in an automobile collision 
in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. Almost two years later, on 
July 3, 1995, Boley filed a complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.1 
Two days after filing the complaint Boley attempted to serve 
Kaymark by sending a copy of the complaint and summons 
to his home address via certified mail. The mailing did not 
include the forms necessary for Kaymark to waive personal 
service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d). Absent a waiver, the 
Federal Rules require either personal service or, pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1), service that complies with state law.2 
Boley, however, made no further attempt to perfect service 
within the 120-day period required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pennsylvania's statutory period for bringing a personal injury action 
is 
two years. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 5524(2). 
 
2. Boley's attempted service by mail was insufficient under Pennsylvania 
law. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 400, 403. 
 




On February 22, 1996, Kaymark moved to dismiss 
Boley's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) for failure 
to serve process within 120 days.3 On March 4, 1996, Boley 
moved the court for an extension of time to serve pursuant 
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The district court denied Boley's 
motion to extend time and granted Kaymark's motion to 
dismiss the complaint on August 29, 1996. Boley timely 
filed this appeal.4 The district court had jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1332, and we have appellate jurisdiction 




We review the district court's denial of a Rule 4(m) 
motion to extend time to serve for abuse of discretion. 
Ayers v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 
1996). The determination whether to extend time involves a 
two-step inquiry. Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 
F.3d 1298, 1305 (3d Cir. 1995). The district courtfirst 
determines whether good cause exists for a plaintiff's 
failure to effect timely service. If good cause exists, the 
extension must be granted. Id.; see also , Fed. R. Civ. P. 
4(m). If good cause does not exist, the district court must 
consider whether to grant a discretionary extension of time. 
MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 
1098 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 64 (1996). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In response to Kaymark's motion to dismiss, Boley twice attempted 
service by mailing to Kaymark's residence additional copies of the 
complaint and summons, along with the waiver form. Apart from being 
untimely, the mailings did not effect service because Kaymark did not 
execute and return the waiver. 
 
4. On September 9, 1996, Boley filed a motion for relief from judgment 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) and (6). On October 7, Kaymark filed its 
opposition. Meanwhile, on September 26, Boley filed his notice of appeal. 
The district court did not rule on the motion. In his brief, Boley has 
appended a copy of his motion together with the attached exhibits, 
which were not a part of the record before the district court when it 
ruled on the motion to dismiss. We grant Kaymark's motion to strike 
those portions of Boley's motion that were not before the district court. 
See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); Petrucelli v. Bohringer and Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 
1298, 1307 n.12 (3d Cir. 1995); Martin v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 851 F.2d 703, 706 n.2 (3d Cir. 1988). 
 




A. Mandatory Extension for Good Cause 
 
The district court found that good cause had not been 
shown for Boley's failure to effect timely service. In 
determining whether good cause exists, a court's "primary 
focus is on the plaintiff's reasons for not complying with 
the time limit in the first place." Id. at 1097. Nothing in the 
record before the district court justified Boley's ineffective 
attempts at service and his failure to make a timely motion 
for an extension of time; as in MCI, the district court was 
"presented with no explanations as to what, if any, 
circumstances constitute sufficient `good cause' to excuse 
[plaintiff 's] apparent lack of diligence." Id. The district court 
therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding that good 
cause had not been shown. 
 
B. Discretion to Extend Time for Service  
 
The district court acknowledged that even in the absence 
of good cause, Rule 4(m) gives it discretion to extend the 
time for service. See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1307. It said: 
        The Court notes that even in the absence of good cause 
       we may either dismiss the case without prejudice or 
       extend time for service. The Court declines to grant an 
       extension because of Boley's inexcusable delays and 
       the prejudice such an extension would impose on 
       Kaymark. 
 
The court's summary statement in effect recapitulates its 
reasons for finding lack of good cause. That finding was 
proper for the reasons that (1) Boley had offered no 
explanation for his delay in making service, and (2) the 
running of the statute of limitations is not a proper 
consideration in determining whether good cause exists. 
Petrocelli, 46 F.3d at 1306. It does not follow, however, that 
the finding reflects a proper analysis under the 
discretionary step of Rule 4(m). 
 
That Boley's delays were inexcusable, of course, merely 
reiterates the substance of the finding of no good cause and 
standing alone does not reflect an exercise of the discretion 
Rule 4(m) gives the court to extend time to serve in the 
absence of good cause. See MCI, 71 F.3d at 1098-99 
(granting a discretionary extension on a record devoid of a 
 




showing by plaintiff of good cause). Critical to that finding 
was Boley's lack of explanation. See id. at 1097 ("absence 
of prejudice alone can never constitute good cause"). In its 
discretionary analysis, however, the court relied on its 
finding of prejudice to Kaymark, premised on the fact that, 
were an extension of time to effect service given to Boley, 
Kaymark would lose the benefit of the running of the 
statute of limitations. 
 
In drafting the amendment of Rule 4(m), the Advisory 
Committee plainly had in mind, as its Notes state, 
"authoriz[ing] the court to relieve a plaintiff of the 
consequences of an application of this subdivision even if 
there is no good cause shown. . . . Relief may be justified, 
for example, if the applicable statute of limitations would bar 
the refiled action . . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) Adv. Comm. 
Notes (1993) (emphasis added). Interpreting this rule, under 
which the court may extend the time for service to avoid 
the bar of limitations, to authorize the court to refuse to 
extend it so the defendant may gain the benefit of that bar 
appears to us to be inconsistent with its purpose. See, e.g., 
Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 662, 666- 
67 (D. Vt. 1996) (extending time in part to prevent 
plaintiff 's case from being barred). We are aware of no 
decisions refusing to grant an extension to serve under 
Rule 4(m) solely on the ground that denying the defendant 
the benefit of the running of the statute of limitations 
amounts to cognizable prejudice. 
 
That is not to say that the failure to make timely service 
may not prejudice a defendant. Delay may damage a 
defendant's ability to defend on the merits. See, e.g., Gowan 
v. Teamsters Union (237), 170 F.R.D. 356, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (witness might not be available to testify and 
evidence was probably destroyed); Shaw v. Rolex Watch 
U.S.A. Inc., 745 F. Supp. 982, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (without 
ruling on prejudice, court noted that named defendant died 
in the interim). In other contexts, as well, findings of 
prejudice have been limited to circumstances in which 
delay impaired a defendant's ability to defend. See, e.g., 
Nelson v. County of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1014-15 (3d 
Cir. 1995) (under Rule 15(c), prejudice depended on 
whether defendant for lack of notice would have to 
 




assemble evidence when case was already stale) cert. 
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1266 (1996); Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling 
Co., 691 F.2d 653, 657 (3d Cir. 1982) (under Rule 60(b), no 
prejudice absent loss of available evidence or "increased 
potential for fraud or collusion"). Moreover, actual notice to 
a defendant that an action was filed militates against a 
finding of prejudice. See, e.g., Dominic v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 
841 F.2d 513, 517 (3d Cir. 1988) (no prejudice to defendant 
under Rule 4(j) where defendant had actual notice of 
plaintiff 's claim and facts on which it was grounded); see 
also, Benjamin v. Grosnick, 999 F.2d 590, 592 (1st Cir. 
1993) (no prejudice under Rule 4(j) where defendant had 
actual notice of lawsuit); Spencer v. Steinman, ___ F. Supp. 
___, 1997 WL 359028, *3 (E.D. Pa. June 24, 1997) (noting 
that actual notice "is crucial" to determining prejudice to 
the defendant); Myers v. Secretary of the Dep't. of the 
Treasury, ___ F.R.D. at ___, 1997 WL 306839 at *5 (E.D.N.Y 
June 4, 1997) (rejecting prejudice when evidence showed 
defendant had been involved in settling merits claim). Here, 
it is not disputed that Kaymark was sent a copy of the 
complaint only two days after it was filed, and he makes no 
claim of lack of actual notice. 
 
District courts have consistently interpreted Rule 4(m) in 
the same way, treating the running of the statute of 
limitations as a factor favoring the plaintiff and not as a 
basis for potential prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., 
Mason Tenders Dist. Council Pension Fund v. Messara, 1997 
WL 221200 *4-5 (S.D.N.Y. April 1, 1997); Rose v. Forbes 
Metro. Hosp., 72 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 549, 1996 WL 
752530, *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1996); National Union Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Forman 635 Joint Venture, 1996 WL 272074, *3 
(S.D.N.Y. May 21, 1996); Binicewicz v. General Elec. Co., 
1995 WL 628425, *2-3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 1995); Pickney v. 
Sheraton Soc'y Hill, 1994 WL 376862, *3 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 
1994); Williams v. United Parcel Serv., 1991 WL 264651, *2 
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1991). 
 
We conclude that while the running of the statute of 
limitations is a factor supporting the discretionary granting 
of an extension of time to make service under Rule 4(m), it 
is not a factor that standing alone supports a finding of 
prejudice to the defendant. As stated by one district court, 
 




prejudice "involves impairment of defendant's ability to 
defend on the merits, rather than foregoing such a 
procedural or technical advantage." National Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Barney Assoc., 130 F.R.D. 291, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 
The district court, of course, retains discretion to refuse 
to extend time, even if the statute of limitations has run. 
See Petrucelli, 46 F.3d at 1306 ("a district court may in its 
discretion still dismiss the case, even after considering 
that . . . the refiling of an action is barred"). See, e.g., 
Adams v. Allied Signal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d 882, 
887-88 (8th Cir. 1996) (refusing a discretionary extension of 
time to serve despite the running of the statute of 
limitations). In this case, however, the court's exercise of its 
discretion was premised on an erroneous finding of 
prejudice. 
 
Because we do not know what choice the district court 
would have made had it correctly considered the relevant 
factors bearing on the exercise of discretion, see United 
States v. Monaco, 23 F.3d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1994); Lieb v. 
Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1986), we 
VACATE the order and REMAND for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. On remand the district court 
may find it appropriate to augment the record on the 
parties' motion. 
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